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ICEIS 2004 received 609 paper submissions from 60 different countries, from all continents. 89 papers were published and orally presented as full papers, i.e. completed work, 145 position papers reflecting work-in-progress were accepted for short presentation and another 138 for poster presentation. These numbers, leading to a "full-paper" acceptance ratio below 15%, show the intention of preserving a high quality forum for the next editions of this conference. Additionally, as usual in the ICEIS conference series, a number of invited talks, including keynote lectures and technical tutorials were also held. These special presentations made by internationally recognized experts have definitely increased the overall quality of the Conference and provided a deeper understanding of the Enterprise Information Systems field. Their contributions have been included in a special section of this book.
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INTRODUCTION
Information technology investments have always been risky and their mortality rates have in the long term been above the average in any industry. Research into system development in general and software engineering in particular has, over the years, suggested a plethora of approaches to address this challenge (Fitzerald, 1996) and many of them have been shown to improve software development capability. Improved technological approaches in a number of fields such as requirements engineering (Bubenko, 1995; Loucopoulos et al., 1995) , conceptual modelling (Doyle et al., 1993; Yu et al., 1994) , and design paradigms (Carroll, 2002; Potts, 1996) represent very significant responses of researchers and practitioners in ameliorating this situation. A recent study (The-Standish-Group, 2003) revealed that when compared to a similar study carried out in 1995, the number of failed projects has decreased, as has the cost overruns but projects continue to be delivered late and over 50% of them fail to meet their initial objectives The UK National Audit Office in its report of 19 th January 2004 on Ministry of Defence Major Projects stated that "… total current forecast costs are £51.9 billion, an increase of £3.1 billion in the last year and some six per cent over approval." and that "….projects have slipped an average of 18 months beyond their expected delivery dates" (National- Audit-Office, 2004 ).
This report refers to projects whose complexity and dynamism far exceeds the systems of previous times. A key question therefore is that if we were unsuccessful in delivering yesterday's systems what chance is there for developing tomorrow's systems that are intended to serve a whole raft of complex requirements? Consider the following examples. GM's next generation car will involve over 100 million lines of code and must interface not only with the car control systems (brakes, emission control etc) but also with external entertainment systems, telecommunication systems, and even business applications. Boeing's new 7E7 is not only innovative in its use of material technologies which make it the lightest commercial jet in the world but deals with the challenge of deploying new software platforms that enable large scale integration of design information and production information along the supply chain. Clearly, the main roots and challenges related to overcoming system development risks of such scale are now quite different than they were 10 or 20 years ago. Naturally, there are many issues that could be examined in a discussion paper. Whilst recognising that these are not the only issues of concern, this paper focuses its attention on four themes:
Ecological complexity Product complexity Project management and Education
Ecological complexity is about poorly understood and unpredictable interactions with the system development environment and the system development task and is discussed in section 2. Ecological complexity interacts with and influences other levels of complexity called product complexity. Product complexity is normally measured by LOC measures, function points or the number of interacting system components and its theme is taken up in terms of conceptual framework in section 3. The issue of project management is approached from an empirical perspective and is discussed in section 4, in terms of defining the project requirements right and then establishing a set of design actions to meet these requirements. Educating the developers and project managers of the future, who have to deal with an increasingly challenging set of demands in a complex and fast changing environment, is the topic of section 5.
ECOLOGICAL COMPLEXITY
The main issue in very large scale development efforts is in understanding how strategies that drive technological choices -i.e. functional requirements, data standards, platform standards, issues of interoperability-relate to organizational control strategies i.e. who has the right to decide and control such functional requirements, data definitions etc., and how the business value of such decisions will be distributed within the industrial network. In many cases the challenge that developers face is that they cannot assume a centralized control and thereby cannot have the required capability alone to coordinate technological and business development that is necessary to build up a workable business solution. Most development situations involve stakeholders that cannot be controlled (clients in ebusiness, suppliers in Boeing, telecommunication companies in case of GM, etc) and who may resist specific ways to coordinate and manage system architectures and resulting solutions. Any development effort of a large scale sociotechnical system (IT investment) within any industry can be configured within two dimensions: (a) the structure of control for information technologies, and (b) the structure of control for human/organization actors. On the information technologies dimension, the structure of control can be configured either as a centralized (centralized databases, Enterprise Resource Planning Systems) or distributed structure (web-based services). Likewise, the human/organization actors dimension can also be configured as a centralized structure, with vertical control systems around dominant industry actors (like Boeing in aerospace industry or the Big Three in auto manufacturing) or a distributed structure without such dominant actors (like 2 nd and 3 rd tier suppliers of manufacturing industries). A doubly distributed socio-technical system is conceived as one in which both the information technologies and the human /organizational actors are distributed, and architectural control is lax. Successful application of information technology to date has fallen outside the boundaries of this type of doubly distributed system. In all three other areas the success has been less successful than originally imagined (e.g. the difficulty in implementing and organizing market based systems in car industry like Covisint). The original industrial application of information technology began with centralized IT architectures in vertically integrated organizational systems inside organizations. In recent years, organizations have developed various forms of IT systems with centralized control that support distributed organizational designs. Prominent examples of such applications include centralized knowledge repositories or ERP systems based on centralized database for the entire enterprise. As organizations have attempted to apply the centralized IT architecture beyond the traditional boundary of the firm, they have faced numerous organizational and technical challenges. For example, many of the small 2 nd and 3 rd tier suppliers in the aerospace and automotive industries are still not connected to the centralized ERP systems that were implemented by the dominant players in the industry. Similarly, distributed information technology systems can effectively serve centralized organizations, as web servers and IBM's ambitious plans for 'On Demand' service attest. If organizations attempt to seek to apply this distributed computing model into distributed organizational structures, however, it will require reconfiguration of organizational systems and control around powerful players outside the organization in order to effectively integrate different IT systems and related business processes. This presents an unprecedented challenge for innovation and organizational change, because knowledge is embedded in local work practices and professional communities, but it must be coordinated across a larger industrial system. Reconfiguring such distributed organizing forms into a centralized system is difficult and in most cases will fail as within the current power system it may be institutionally impossible. In a doubly distributed (DD) system in particular we do not have many examples of success. Yet, this doubly distributed quadrant will arguably be the next frontier of information technology innovations 2 ENTERPRISE INFORMATION SYSTEMS VI spanning industrial organizations that lack central power structures. In the DD system, firms are embedded many times in traditional contracting relations, which maintain competitive and zero sum interactions among them.
Normally, each professional group has its own favoured and limited set of information technology tools, which are often not easily integrated. What is needed here is a new joined socio-technical design that supports distributed organizing forms through coupling heterogeneous IT infrastructures in multiple communities of practice. There are multiple challenges in managing and designing such systems: (Fichman, 2004) . There is also a need to understand how increased formalization and standardization vs. flexibility and innovation are balanced in such initiatives.
PRODUCT COMPLEXITY
Product complexity, has been addressed by several technological solutions that deal with abstraction (wrappers, typing, information hiding), binding mechanisms (late binding, lazy evaluation, RMI), run time control (e.g. messaging protocols), and standardized semantics (ERP, vertical messaging standards). Traditionally, methodological efforts focused their attention on appropriate description languages, support tools, ways of working, and architectures aimed at essentially ensuring that an engineeringlike approach could be followed when developing such systems (Olle et al., 1984; Olle, 1992) . The debate has shifted in the past few years towards system co-development whose aim is to ensure alignment between business processes and support technical systems. In terms of this particular set of concerns, product complexity manifests itself in knowledge components that need to be used during codevelopment. The term 'enterprise knowledge modelling' refers to a collection of techniques for describing different facets of the organisational domain e.g., goals, structures and work roles, flow of information etc, as well as the rationale behind these operations, the operational domain e.g., the business processes, business rules etc and the informational domain e.g., the database structures, the mappings between different (possibly heterogeneous databases) and the rules for and from discovered patterns of behaviour in data (Loucopoulos, 2000; Bubenko, 1994; Loucopoulos et al., 1997; Loucopoulos, 2004) . It is a natural extension to information modelling whereby the models target not just the information PROJECT FAILURES: CONTINUING CHALLENGES FOR SUSTAINABLE INFORMATIO N SY STEMS system requirements but also the enterprise objectives, the work processes, the customer needs and processes that create value for customers. The models take a holistic view and cut across traditional functional boundaries. Inputs and outcomes to the development process are sign-based artefacts, making it unique amongst all other types of engineering projects. It can be regarded as a semiotic engineering, or a process of semiosis (Liu, 2000; Liu et al., 2002) . From a semiotic perspective, an information systems project is a process of transformation from a set of signs (at the level of representation) to another set at a different level. The systems development activities are continual processes of semiosis, each involving different stakeholders. Whilst in traditional information systems development one dealt with strictly IT artefacts, in a co-development project, we deal with multifarious objects in an effort to better align the information system to the enterprise and at the same to explore the opportunities offered by IT in developing the enterprise itself. A semiotic transformation constitutes an assembly of interrelated sign-based activities logically linked to enable the analyst, designer and others to formalise and elicit requirements using the sign-process (i.e. semiosis). This method is highly efficient in examining and representing the requirements of the different, yet closely interrelated stages and levels of the systems transformation. The key elements which make each transformation works are the norms e.g. the rules and regulations that govern the practise of users, analysts, designers and others within each semiosis process (Liu et al., 2002) . In dealing with product complexity it is important to capture requirements as early as possible and not to rely on an assumption that somehow system requirements will emerge. What distinguishes early requirements from late (or support system) requirements, is the degree of involvement of client stakeholders. Early requirements are almost exclusively driven by client stakeholders' communication and it is this communication that has to be facilitated through a semiotic process. The modelling approach to be adopted may involve a cycle of hypothesis formulation, testing, and reformulation until stakeholders have enough confidence about the relevance of the proposed solution. Essentially, one is developing theories, externalised as conceptual models, about the Universe of Discourse and subjects these theories to tests for their validity.
PROJECT MANAGEMENT
Experiences have shown that for many failed projects:
we got our requirements wrong, and we did not focus our design energy and project management energy on meeting a clear set of project requirements.
In this section, ten principles of good project management are put forward which have proved in practice be feasible and effective in delivering good quality systems.
P1: The critical few product
objectives of the project need to be stated measurably.
The major reason for project investment is always to reach certain levels of product performance. 'Performance' as used here, defines how good the system function is. It includes system qualities -how well the system performs, system savings -how cost-effective the system is compared to alternatives such as competitors or older systems. and work capacity how fast and how much the system can do of work.
In practice one is able to be concerned with about 5 to 20 'most-critical' product performance dimensions. These are the critical dimensions that determine if a project has been a success or failure, in terms of the product produced by that project.
P2:
The project team must be rewarded to the degree they achieve these critical project objectives.
Of course if we still cannot specify the performance goals quantitatively, then no amount of motivation and freedom will get a project team to move in the right direction. Experience has shown that any requirement specification has between 80 and 180 'major' defects. This is normally a 'shock' for the people involved. How can there be so many? Most people immediately agree that this is far too many. It is.
And it is unnecessary! One should set a limit of no more than one major defect per page remaining before the specification is released for serious uses like design or test planning.
The conclusion is that because we do not carry out even simple inexpensive sampling measures of specification pollution, and we do not set a limit to the pollution, we live in a world of engineering that is normally highly polluted. We pay for this by project delays, and product quality.
P5: Design Review must be based on a clean specification, and should be focused on whether designs meet their multiple requirements.
Before we can review a design specification regarding relevance, we must review it for compliance to rules of specification that assures us about the intelligibility of the specification.
P6: The high-risk strategies need to be validated early, or swapped with better ones.
Engineers have always had a number of techniques for validating risky strategies early. Trials, pilots, experiments, prototypes, etc are the tactics. One approach in IT projects is scheduling the delivery of the risky strategy in an early evolutionary delivery step, to measure what happens -and thus get rid of some of the risk. Early evolutionary delivery steps usually integrate a strategy with a real system and real users -and are therefore more trustworthy, than for example an expert review panel.
P7: Adequate resources need to be allocated to deliver the design strategies.
It is not sufficient for the adopted design strategies will meet the performance targets. The appropriate resources must be present to use the design strategies. Furthermore, the resources must not result in an unprofitable situation, even if the resources are available. The resources are both for development and operation, even decommissioning. The resources are of many types and include money, human effort and calendar time. The management solution to this common problem is to demand that projects are done evolutionarily.
That means there will be consciously planned early (first month) and frequent (perhaps weekly or 2% of budget) attempts to deliver measurable value to real stakeholders. Although such an approach may be contrary to practices that many people are used, there are decades of practical proof in the software and systems engineering world that this works (Larman et al., 2003) .
P9: The requirements should not put unnecessary constraints on the delivery of performance and consequent value.
It is all too common for projects to focus on a particular technical solution or architecture, and not to focus on the actual end results they expect to get from the technical 'design'. They end up locking themselves into the technical solution -and rarely get the results they expected.
P10: The project should be free to give priority to value delivery, and not be constrained by PROJECT FAILURES: CONTINUING CHALLENGES FOR SUSTAINABLE INFORMATION SYSTEMS
well-intended processes and standards.
Recommended frameworks and processes should encourage focusing on the main results of a project rather than exclusively on the standards processes. These 10 principles have been applied successfully on many projects worldwide. Further reading can be found in (Gilb et al., 1988; GIlb et al., 1993) .
EDUCATION
To understand the needs for educating the next generation of information systems developers and managers, it is perhaps useful to establish a set of key observations (Maciaszek et al., 2005) :
Enterprise information system is more than a software system (it includes also people, data, procedures, communications, and of course hardware). Software process is part of business process (the result of a software process is software; the result of a business process is business). Software engineering is different from traditional engineering (the immaterial and changeable nature of software are but two factors that make the difference). Software engineering is more than programming (software engineering applies to complex problems that cannot be solved by programming alone). Software engineering is about modeling (all products of software engineering, including programs, are abstractions of reality). Enterprise information systems are complex (the complexity of modern software is in the 'wires' -in the linkages and communication paths between components).
First and foremost, it should be clear from the key observations that a software system of EIS complexity cannot be built bottom-up by "hacking" the code before a clear and complexity-minimizing architectural framework for the system is defined. It is not possible to construct a building (other than a shed in the garden) without prior architectural drawings. Similarly, it is not possible to program a system (other than a student assignment) without a prior architectural design that identifies software components and shows how they need to be integrated into a system. Regrettably, the educational perspective on architectural design issues is not helpful. It is not quite possible in an educational set-up to teach the students the magnitude of EIS development. In education we can only afford the programming inthe-small. We cannot offer the software engineering in-the-large. And unfortunately 'in-the-small' does not scale up to 'in-the-large'.
Moreover, it is not educationally sound to teach topdown, i.e. from high-level abstraction to low-level design and programming. Abstraction means a purposeful concealment of irrelevant details for the intended semantics of the model. This means that the details are known to, or at least realized by, the developer. It follows that in education we have to teach details before abstraction. We have no choice but to learn about EIS development in a bottom-up way, but we will eventually apply the knowledge and skills gained in a top-down way. For many the hurdle proves too high when faced with the reality of a commercial software project. Is there anything that the education system can do to alleviate the problems raised above? Well, we must try to teach abstraction in small steps, for small tasks, even if the task could be solved (coded) directly. We must teach students modelling (no matter how trivial) before programming, thinking before doing, reading instructions and manuals before hitting the keyboard.
Second, we must move away from the building from scratch educational principle. This is not the way complex systems can be built. Complex systems demand reuse and collaboration. Reuse must embrace all its forms -libraries, frameworks, and patterns. Telling students that collaboration is a form of plagiarism is not good enough. The necessary condition for teaching reuse and collaboration is to make a team software project an important part of the curriculum. This should be a compulsory part of any computing or IS degree and it should ideally be a course over the full academic year. An ensuing condition is that commercial software development platforms should be used on the project. This includes a CASE (computer-assisted software engineering) tool supporting teamwork, an IDE (integrated development environment) supporting versions and software builds, a DBMS (database management system) supporting construction of a single database shareable by all project teams (after all in an enterprise -"applications come and go, the database stays for ever").
Third, we must engrave in students' minds that the problem is complex but the solution must be simple. Development of EIS software is not about ENTERPRISE INFORMATION SYSTEMS VI innovation and satisfying developers' egos and urges. Many software projects fail because of "bells and whistles" built into them. Fortunately, at least one requirement for simple solutions is naturally met by education. That requirement is known as time-boxing -a project management technique that puts "time boxes" around each task so that any expected slippages for the task completion are counteracted by simplifying the solution. As the last thing that the future users of the system need is a complex solution for their problems, time-boxing has been a very successful technique. Software projects in the educational surroundings are naturally "time-boxed" by the deadlines which must be met.
Fourth, we must educate in a way commensurate with the rapid technology changes. This means that we should teach by passing knowledge, experience, wisdom -passing lasting values and leaving acquisition of skills to professional training and selfeducation. The above does not mean that university education should be void of teaching professional skills. The issue is more about the mode of education to be applied so that the students can acquire necessary skills. Using a lecture room to teach the syntax of a programming language or how to debug the code is a misguided effort. This can only be done in hands-on exercises in laboratories under a careful guidance of an experienced developer. Too frequently in universities "the experienced developer" is merely a senior student or inexperienced tutor.
Fifth, we must accept that an EIS is a social system and that most project failures have little to do with the technology. Many technologically brilliant systems fail and many technologically inferior solutions are successful. Most project failures can be attributed to "soft components" -people, processes, management, etc. The introduction of some compulsory "ethical and societal" component in an introductory IS subject is not the answer. Too frequently the graduates of computing and IS courses are bad communicators whose social skills must not be restricted to Internet chat rooms. Does education matter as far as the theme of this paper is concerned? It is our belief that it does matter and that if designed properly and educational programme can make the difference. Paraphrasing the well-known observation that "great designs come from great designers", we can perhaps put forward that "successful projects come from educated developers and are supported by educated maintainers".
CONCLUSIONS
Rapid market changes such as electronic commerce, deregulation, mergers, globalisation and increased competition have led to a business environment that is constantly evolving. The effects of integration and evolution of information technology coupled to the increasing education of people provide opportunities for organising work in ways that have never before been possible (Malone, 2003) . Nowadays, more than ever, failure of IT systems cannot be tolerated. IT developers are faced with extraordinary pressures to achieve designs that result in systems of high reliability. The debate about appropriate development paradigms continues and this short paper is a small contribution to this debate. Our position is that complexity at organisational and product levels demand a closer look at the way that enterprises function and products are developed accordingly. Project management needs to be driven and organised in terms of meeting a clear set of requirements with results being visible early on and in frequent stages during the project. To achieve any sustainable improvements we need to also pay attention to educational programmes in broadening the student's technical spectrum in a way that highlights the interrelated nature of developing systems, business strategies and business processes in a systemic manner.
LARGE SCALE REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS AS1 INTRODUCTION
Information systems development (ISD) has remained a high-risk proposition despite huge advances in computing and telecommunications technologies. Information systems projects in general, and large information systems projects in particular continue to fail at an unacceptable rate (Abdel-Hamid and Madnick 1990; Myers 1994; Drummond 1996; Mitev 1996; Rosenwein 1997) . While some portion of troubled ISD projects is turned around successfully, intensive research in the past has generated little understanding in how to avoid failures in large systems development initiatives. From the growing incidence of failed projects, we conclude that advances in technologies are not sufficient to save large projects. Instead, they remain susceptible to failure until we learn to understand how technological, organizational and institutional changes are interwoven in large systems, and how system developers should accordingly state and manage requirements for such systems. Consider the following example. On March 11, 1993 the world was shocked by the sudden cancellation of the Taurus project, which the London Stock Exchange had been developing for more than six years. Taurus was expected to be instrumental in the radical restructuring the securities trade, widely known as the Big Bang, by forming a backbone system for the London Stock Exchange. The project cost the Stock Exchange $130 million, and securities companies invested $600 million more (Drummond 1996) . After years of alternating embarrassments and heroic efforts, Taurus was cancelled before a single module was implemented because the required functionality and performance could never be delivered. Although Taurus was a very complex project, involving novel technologies and massive organizational and institutional scale, ineffective project controls allowed requirements to change continuously throughout the project. Moreover, management ignored clear warning signs about organizational and technical risks, whilst powerful interests pushed for Taurus' development despite confusion over the system's purpose and design. Simply, there was no understanding what the systems was supposed to do and what stakeholders it should serve. In the end, advocates held an almost superstitious faith in the project, dismissing objections and proposals for modifications and clearer statement of the requirements with comments like "...we have had all those arguments. Great idea but no, we have been arguing about it for twelve years, forget it" (Drummond 1996) (p. 352). With the benefit of hindsight, the Taurus failure could have been averted by adjusting its course based on a more delicate and politically sensitive requirements engineering. But this was not done despite a well known truism shared both in academia and industry that systematic requirements engineering is a keystone to a successful delivery of a large scale system. The failure of Taurus can be partly attributed to the dismissal of this well known fact, but we think there is more to learn. Taurus failure was also due to the fact that we poor knowledge about how to state and manage requirements for large systems that involve political and institutional elements. Stating requirements for such systems is not just a technical exercise, but necessitates a new mind set which we call "heterogeneous engineering" after Hughes (Hughes 1979a; Hughes 1979b; Hughes 1987) . Heterogeneous engineering sees all requirements specifications to be inherently heterogeneous due to the need to establish stable networks involving both social and technical elements through engineering (if the network is not stable the system fails!). As Law (Law 1987) (p. 112) puts this: "The argument is that those who build artifacts do not concern themselves with artifacts alone, but must also consider the way in which the artifacts relate to social, economic, political, and scientific factors. All of these factors are interrelated, and all are potentially malleable." Consequently, requirements engineers need to be seen as "heterogeneous engineers" who must successfully associate entities that range from people, through skills, to artifacts and natural phenomena. In this paper we will examine the problem of stating and managing requirements for large system development initiatives qua "heterogeneous engineering." Our argument is twofold. First we will argue that failures like the Taurus disaster do not happen only because existing approaches to requirements engineering have not been adopted. In contrast, we argue that current requirements engineering techniques used alone will not do the job. This is because they are based on a fallacious assumption that business problems and political problems can be separated from technical requirements engineering concerns of how to specify a consistent and complete technical solution to a business problem. In contrast, large scale system development initiatives involve a simultaneous consideration of business, institutional, political, technical and behavioral issues. Second, based on behavioral theories of decision-making we argue, that solutions and problems are intertwined and addressed simultaneously during a requirements engineering process. Thus, requirements engineering can be understood only by using theories of behavioral and institutional decision making along with applied technical understandings, but not only through the lens of rational technical "engineering." The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we shortly examine the received "view" of requirements engineering as outlined by the proponents of the current requirements engineering literature. In section 3, we propose an alternative concept of requirements engineering which we call the functional ecology of requirements. In this view, requirements are not discovered but constructed as mappings between solution and problem spaces. The construction process involves a protracted "walk" between these spheres. Section 4 concludes the paper by drawing some consequences for requirements engineering research.
REQUIREMENTS ENGINEERING DEFINED
The concept of a system requirement is relatively well known in the system and software engineering literature since mid 70's. The concept was originally conceived to involve the stating what the system is supposed to do before stating how the system produces the desired functionality (Ross 1977) . The earliest concepts of system requirements can be traced back to work of Langefors (Langefors 1966) and some early attempts to develop high level system description languages 1 . One reason for separating the how and the what can be attributed to the desire to achieve what we call a "responsibility push-back". By this we mean the desire to relegate the failure to develop or implement the system to the prior environment, which gave rise to the definition of the system development task. Such attempts to move the "reasons" for failure to higher level system environments has been a continuing trend in software engineering and system development since the mid 70's. This has gradually shifted the interest of the software engineering and system development communities from implementation considerations (like "structured programming", "structured design") into problems of how to define what the system is expected to do and what this involves. This is currently called fashionably "requirements engineering" (RE) (Kotonya and Sommerville 1998). The main concept in the requirements engineering is the desire to repeatably create successful systems. The main interest in the requirements engineering literature is to explore the means to express and articulate the desire to develop the system, i.e. how to define features of the new systems, or how to change current systems that will solve an identified business need, want, or desire (Loucopoulos and Karakostas 1995; Pohl 1996; Sommerville and Sawyer 1997) . Therefore, the requirements engineering literature has concentrated on developing tools and methods which answer questions like: Who's desire? How to express the desire? Who and what defines success and failure criteria for addressing the desire? For example, when doing user-centered design, the end-users of the new or changed system are expected to define success & failure criteria (Pohl 1996; Noyes and Baber 1999) . At the same time, knowledge of the current state of the art of system design can influence the choice of success & failure criteria. These can be seen as system design constraints and opportunities, which can also affect, i.e. change, the identified business wants, needs, and desires. In general, requirements in the received literature are seen to establish these success & failure criteria. The "received" definition is the IEEE standard 610.12 (Loucopoulos and Karakostas 1995; Pohl 1996) , which defines requirement as: 1. A condition or capability needed by a user to solve a problem or achieve an objective.
THE FUNCTIONAL ECOLOGY OF REQUIREMENTS

Need for a Conceptual Model
In this section we will create a systematic conceptual model of RE from an emergent functional perspective. The term functional in the term suggests that any RE analysis is done in pursuit of practical objectives for a given task domain, such as to make task accomplishment more efficient and/or effective. We use the term emergent to capture the evolutionary view of how organizational goals, problems and solutions are constructed during the RE, as opposed to discovered, in alignment with a behavioral view of human decision making.
We will develop the model through a set of conceptual clarifications and definitions, which define exactly 2 the content of the major components of a requirements specification situation. These include the concepts of problem, solution, requirement, principal and goals. These are derived (though not explicitly) from a careful reading and analysis of the literature in institutional decisionmaking in complex domains. As with any conceptual model, our main goal is to define the major analytic relationships between these concepts. Constructing this model allows us to define more exactly what functional emergence means and why such emergence is inevitable, thus making large scale RE so hard to do successfully. We highlight how the model can explain origins and sources of RE complexity. In turn, the further analysis of the model offers means to understand the challenge we face on both conceptual and practical levels for constructing and stating adequately requirements. As we will show, the model enables us to pinpoint more exactly major disagreements with the received IEEE definition. By developing rigorously such a vocabulary 3 and underlying model for discussing large scale RE in all its complexity, the conceptual model enables us later on to formulate research questions more systematically and to develop techniques that can help manage such processes. Though, the suggested model is still in line with a dominating model of RE in which it is assumed that organizational goals are clear 4 , it digresses from it in how organizations and actors approach these goals and what mechanisms they have at hand for accomplishing those objectives. A prevailing bias in the requirements engineering literature is the notion that requirements exist "out there" waiting to be captured by the systems analyst and refined then into a complete and consistent specification for the system that will be thereafter created (Davis 1993; Loucopoulos and Karakostas 1995; Macaulay 1996; Pohl 1996; Kotonya and Sommerville 1998) . Consequently, the main focus has been on formalizing the content of the system that will deliver the solutions and how this meets the objectives of being complete and consistent. Continued disappointing experiences in large-scale system development suggest, however, that the challenge is a good deal more complicated. One point we want to make is that the content of the system may mean different things for different people, and it is dynamical due to ambiguity and uncertainty related to the goals of the stakeholders and the solutions, which can be brought to bear upon identified problems.
Requirements Analysis Framework
The crux of the ecological view is to adopt insights from the study of human decision processes and use this to inform our formulation of the RE framework. We draw on two major sources in this endeavor that digress considerably from the dominating "technical rationality" of RE. First, in any complex development initiative, including RE, we must take seriously Simon's theory of bounded rationality [Simon, 1979; Simon, 1982] in that we can never find an optimal, but at most a satisficing solution. Accordingly, RE processes should be analyzed and understood from the view point of heuristics, limited search spaces and the quest for increased intelligence during the RE process. This is what RE methods and tools seek to offer. But their problem is that they scale up poorly for large systems, and in addition they fail to recognize the type complexity inherent in large scale RE. Second, we will draw upon the institutional and behavioral theories of decision making which have in the past decades studied complex organizational decision making processes involving complex social, business or political change (March and Olsen 1976; Lindblom 1979) . These studies have shown that complex organizational decisions are not discrete events (i.e. bets) in which pros and cons are weighed and optimal decisions are rendered. Instead, organizational decision-making forms a protracted processes of iteration in which problems search for solutions, solutions search for problems, and decision makers search for decisions to be made (March and Olsen 1976) . In the organizational theory, this is coined the "Garbage-Can Model." It is so named because of the relatively permanent nature of the cans in which different solutions, problems and decisions are "thrown" within an organizational arena. Available experience from many large scale RE (e.g., software engineering) initiatives coincide with this view. The development of World Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) of the 1970's and early 1980's formed a continued process of redefining this "can" over two decades. Hence, contrary to common assumptions underlying RE, RE decisions are implicated by solutions searching for problems rather than the other way around. The behavioral study of decision-making has thus benefited from the transformation of the "problem solution" construction underlying RE research into a more evolutionary view of RE represented as "solution problem solution" iteration. We will next refine this model. We will therefore begin with an examination of what a "solution space" means in relation to requirements, followed by an examination of the mediating "problem space." This leads us to articulate the requirements analysis process as an iterative "walk" between the solution and problem spaces. The main components of the framework are depicted in Figure 1 . The acronyms M and N in the figure describe how different components in the RE environment can be related to one another during a RE process (i.e. many to many).
Solution Space
The ecological view suggests that any RE process starts from an existing solution space, S t , that will be affected by a proposed new or changed system (see Figure 1) . We depict the continuous construction and movement of solutions by rotating arrows around the solution space. The "existing solution" space, that we call the Current Solution Space, is denoted as S t . Fundamentally, this space embodies a history of solved social, technical and procedural problems and it constitutes the legacy (or competency) of previously solved organizational problems. This definition denies that solutions exist a-historically. Instead, they are socially constructed and legitimized. Capabilities to produce such solutions must be acquired and maintained in the surrounding socio-technical system. Therefore, the solution space is intimately related to the principals, i.e. a set of actors who have the capability to represent themselves as capable of arriving at solutions to an identified problem, or who possess specific skills that can result in specific solutions. The solutions are socially constructed also in the sense that the principals must find solutions to fit to their problems and thereby accept the legitimacy of a specific solution to their specific problem. Principals have also incentives to create their own solutions (e.g., goals) so they can influence the social system in which they reside and obtain resources. Accordingly, many times solutions search for problems and not the other way round. Working solutions form instantiations of one or more principals' successful attempts to adapt generic as well as custom technologies to suit to specific business, or social problems. Hence, solutions embody new and novel ways of carrying out organizational tasks often with untried configurations of social arrangements and technical artifacts. Our concept of technology is thus a heterogeneous one in the sense that it covers both social and managerial innovations, and technical innovations that draw upon properties and laws of the physical world and which demand that the final solution is a socio-technical ensemble (Law 1987). A local solution space is a subset of a Global Solution Space, that can be seen to be the union of all solutions, which can in principle be reached from the current solution space if all resources and skills were available. In other words, the global solution space is the space of all feasible solution spaces, including those not currently accessible from the local solution space and which require mobilization of all principals and technologies. Reasons for not being able to reach all of them can be due to lack of resources, lack of intelligence (i.e. this solution is not known or cannot be connected effectively to any known problem), cognitive bias, shifting goals or incompatibility with organizational goal(s) or political structure. In general, a local solution space represents the range of all locally accessible solution spaces with regard to organizational resource limitations. A local solution space is a more general form of a product space as suggested by Davis (1993) , in that it contains the essential attributes and context of a product space.
Anomaly and Problem Spaces
The source of a problem is an anomaly, i.e. a known existing inconsistency between the current solution space and a desired solution space. 6 The set of all such inconsistencies we call an existing Anomaly Space. An anomaly is only a "potential" problem, because not all anomalies are attended by organizations as problems that need to be solved due to resource constraints and cognitive bias. An anomaly becomes a problem only when it is observed and acted upon by a principal with a standing to act 7 . Standing refers here to the power to define and legitimize an anomaly as a problem to be solved by collective action, and the demonstrated capability to mobilize means to address a defined problem 8 . This is normally defined in management statements that justify IT projects, in project goal specifications, or investment memos. A principal is thus assumed to wield organizational power, i.e. to have access to means by which she or he can influence the others and mobilize sufficient resources (Bacharach and Lawler 1980; Pfeffer 1981; Fairholm 1993) . It is important to note that in large scale system development initiatives there are several or large numbers of principals who can obtain a standing in relation to problems identified. Moreover, it is important to understand that in large scale system development initiatives it is necessary to enroll a large number of principals to take a standing and agree on some level of problematization (Baier and March 1986) . Standing can be later on also held by groups as well as individuals at different stages of RE process, which relate to possible rewards, incentives or side-effects of the possible system solution. Lower-level participants in organizations hold such standings due to their knowledge, or access to unique local resources that are critical in proceeding in the project 9 . A case in point here is a system analyst who is using his technical wits and unique knowledge of the situation to direct and channel the proceeding of the development project. Standing can, and often needs, to be changed later on due to learning, incentives or changed politics. Therefore standings can easily drift during a large RE process (Sauer 1994) . Due to cognitive limitations, some anomalies are not recognized by actors with a standing, and thus are not acted upon. Similarly, anomalies can be observed by principals as problems, but they choose not to act upon them due to their resource constraints, or difficulty in defining a solution space which links with the problem (e.g., goal failure). Such processes of inattention relate normally to high political, functional, technical or implementation risks of moving to a new chosen solution space also turn into problems at later stages of RE, or further down in the design process due to learning by doing. In the same vein, principals can later drop problems out of consideration and revert them to mere anomalies, or even beyond that if they change their goal sets, or observe high obstacles to move from the current solution space to the target space 10 . Thus the set of principals is not fixed even after successful RE, but instead contextually emerging and negotiated. Although the causes of anomalies can spring from many sources, the conversion of an anomaly to a problem is a social process we call problematization. Problematization begins long (Lyytinen, Mathiassen et al., 1998b) . Anomalies can before a recognizable problem space has emerged. It begins with a principal's decisions standing to act or not act upon anomalies that turn them into problems. Often, these problematizations can start with the metaproblems of finding out what the problem is to which an existing or an emerging solution can be applied. During this activity, principals determine and apply legitimizing reasons to change an anomaly into a problem. Legitimate reasons normally relate to goals (see Figure 1) , i.e. desirable properties of those solution spaces that can be reached from the current solution space. These goals are therefore not given or fixed, but instead are constructed and negotiated as a result of legitimizing the problematization. This process is by no means trivial exercise as any principal normally pursues several goals at the same time, and the same goal can be chosen by several principals. This results often in situations where the same problem space can relate to many different sources. Moreover, different principals can select them independently. In the same vein, these problems can be later on mapped onto alternative new solution spaces, which means that several often contradictory, or supplementary change processes may be initiated to the same problem causes. An important capability of a principal with standing is the power to define particular characteristics of the desired problem space.
11 These relate to general value statements and rationales underlying organizational action like increased control, competitive capability, shareholder value, or employee participation. Such features can be used to dictate who has a right to address the problem space, why this is regarded as the problem space, among several competing principals who are jockeying to a mandate to address the problem space. Moreover, as Fairholm suggests, such power entails 'the ability to gain aims in interrelationship with others, even in the face of their opposition' 12 . Altogether, it is the principals who define the problems and their sources, and by implication, their resulting solution spaces. Thus, they must be considered the most important RE stakeholders. The space of all problems implied by a current solution space S t is called the Problem Space, denoted here as P. A problem space (e.g., the space of all selected problems) is by definition always a subset of an anomaly space. Hence, a proposed system problem space, denoted by P t , contains all of the recognized and chosen problems by all of the principals at time t 13 . This does not mean that elements of this set are consistent, non-contradictory or selected by following some overarching organizational "goal" set. What we argue instead is that problems in P t have to be contextualized into S t 14 by some principals so that there is an observed need to change the current solution space. Accordingly, they can be later on associated with a proposed new system or system change by some principal with a standing. Figure 2 shows a general relationship between S t and P t where the arcs represent connections to problems in P t from their contextualizing source in S t . It is important to understand that multiple solution sources, as shown in can point to any one problem, and any one solution source can lead to multiple problems. This corresponds to the M:N relationship between the solution space and problem space as depicted in Figure 1 . What this implies is that it is possible for a single problem to have multiple contextualizing sources. Also, a single solution source can contextualize multiple problems. The process of problematization uncovers frequently also other anomalies that are deemed problems by principals. This can trigger an iterative reconsideration of the current solution space and its anomalies resulting in a process called problem blossoming 15 . This iterative process can change the contents, and hence, the structure, of the current solution space (S t ) as well as the problem space (P t ). This process may have to be iterated as long as new affected areas of S t are being discovered and the corresponding anomalies, and resulting problems, are constructed and organized into the current problem space. Once complete, or prematurely stopped by a principal with standing due to the fear of endless search, the resulting problem set is called P t . 
Proposed Solution
A Proposed Solution, denoted as S t+1 , forms a new subspace of the solution space. A proposed solution by definition implies the reconciliation of S t to P t . In other words, each part of a proposed solution must be reconciled with one or more problems in P t until all of the problems in P t are addressed. The process of reconciliation, changing S t into S t+1 17 by solving for P t , is called Solution Space Transformation. Finding this mapping forms the heart of RE. It involves specifying a mapping from a current solution space into a future solution space that is contextualized, or warranted, by the chosen set of problems. In other words, the analyst's job is at the intersection of the two solution spaces (along with technologies embedded in them) and the problem space. During this reconciliation process, constraints are seen as limitations of current organizational resources as well as limitations concerning the future IS, including people, artifacts, rules, processes and the like. It is a custom desire in the RE literature to find an optimum path from S t to S t+1 . This is, however, seldom the case in any given requirements analysis effort, because 1) the prospect of attaining global solutions is quite remote due to changing and shifting needs and goals of the principals, problem blossoming etc, and 2) because system analysts cannot locally foresee the impact of the chosen solution spaces or the difficulty of getting there due to their cognitive and resource limits. The task of the analyst is, instead, to find a traversable path from a current solution space to a new one that meets sufficiently the requirement of removing observed problems (Haumer, Heymans et al., 1999) . This needs to be accomplished also by identifying problems that will arise during the process of transformation. A necessary outcome of the solution space transformation is to transform, and possibly expand, the local solution space, S t . Transforming S t means not only changing, and hence a likely expanding some principals' technical capability. It also means a changing, and presumptively by expansion, the organizational capability within the solution space. Hence, an expansion of S t can reveal previously unavailable, but now realizable opportunities. The process can even expand a general solution space, and thus demonstrate organizational learning and innovation in the sense that new solution "frames" have been created (Lyytinen, Rose et al., 1998a) 18 .
Redefining Requirements
Per our analysis, RE activity involves always a deliberate construction of an ecology that consists of two solution spaces and a problem space 19 . The objective of RE is to reconcile all essential aspects of the current solution space with regard to a problem space thus producing a specification for a particular solution space that can be achieved at some future time point t+x 20 . It is expected that this will mitigate or eliminate the identified problem space (though naturally this cannot be guaranteed). Due to the discovery of goals, problem blossoming and dynamics of the solution spaces, this is an iterative process: new information on both the solution space and the problem space is continually discovered, and consequently decisions need to be continually made to re-state both the solution space and the problem space in the direction of reconciliation. The RE specification is thus an outcome of a co-evolutionary process of discovery and decision, in which both the solution space and the problems space are iteratively constructed. This process is influenced by many constraints arising from the environment itself (e.g., physical laws, technical choices, legal considerations, institutional influences, organizational goals and capabilities, market forces). But, at the bottom, it remains a social process of negotiation and inquiry that is constrained by bounded rationality and limited organizational resources. At this point of our treatise we can contrast this definition of RE with the "received" definition that is common to the requirements engineering literature. As previously stated a requirement as per this literature is: 1. A condition or capability needed by a user to solve a problem or achieve an objective.
2. A condition or capability that must be met or possessed by a system or a system component to satisfy a contract, standard, specification, or other formally imposed document.
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3. A documented representation of a condition or capability as in 1 or 2.
In our terminology, item 1 focuses on meeting some expressed desire of a principal with standing, usually the client or the system's intended user. Such requirements have been called "functional" requirements (Loucopoulos and Karakostas 1995; Pohl 1996) . Item 2 departs from the issue of desire and addresses compliance with conditions set by social or technical environment. Such requirements have been referred to as "nonfunctional" requirements (Loucopoulos and Karakostas 1995; Pohl 1996) . Item 3 expects that a requirement needs to be represented in a document. In other words, if a requirement isn't written up, or equivalent, it is not a requirement.
A good summary of the requirements definition, accordingly, would be: a requirement specifies a written want, need or desire that solves a problem in the context of a set of constraints or a written constraint imposed by a formal document.
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We depart from this nomenclature in two ways. First, we see requirements not as solutions to problems, but as a set of relationships between solution spaces and a problem space. Solutions to problems are determined in design, not during requirements. As such, requirements are no more fixed than the evolving understanding of the characteristics of the two solution spaces and the problem space. Requirements in this sense cannot be discovered, but rather must be constructed by a search in the search space that covers all known mappings between the problem space and the two 
